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Abstract:
While the Baltic Republics began transition from substantially similar starting points,
diverse patterns of enterprise ownership soon emerged. This provides an unusual context in which
to test competing theories on the productivity effects of alternative ownership structures,
including the propositions that outside ownership is more efficient than insider ownership and that
managerial ownership is preferred over employee ownership. New and unusual data sets for large
samples of firms in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania enable comparable production functions
specifications to be estimated for all three countries for varying years during the period 1993-
1996. The main findings are: (i) the effects of majority ownership varies over time within a
country; (ii) the effects of majority ownership varies across countries; (iii) majority employee
ownership has either positive or zero effects upon productivity. Findings thus provide only weak
support for the conventional wisdom.
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1 1. Introduction.
The need for more reliable empirical evidence on which forms of enterprise ownership are
more efficient is especially acute in transition economies where the privatization process often has
led to the largely unexpected growth of widespread insider ownership (Nuti, 1997; Uvalic and
Vaughan-Whitehead, 1997).  In the main, theorists (e.g. Boycko et al. 1993) argue that economic
efficiency in post communist economies demands that the vast bulk of firms in the socialized
sectors should be privatized. The other key matter concerns the preferred ownership structure for
privately owned firms -- whether they are insider or outsider c ntrolle   and, if insider controlled,
 whether the controlling group are managers or workers (Bim et al., 1994).  For reasons including
easier access to capital markets and ease in solving the agency problems of governments that try
to control firms, the dominant view is that firms with outside ownership are expected to be more
efficient than firms owned by insiders (e.g. Boycko et al. 1996). In addition, primarily because of
allegedly providing superior ways of resolving agency issues within the firm, the most efficient
form of insider ownership typically is argued to be manager (rather than employee) ownership
(e.g. Earle and Estrin, 1996). However, in fact theory is more ambiguous on some of these
matters. For example, in the literatures on the economics of participation and transition a number
of arguments have been developed as to why insider ownership (especially when broadly based)
may be more conducive to enhanced organizational performance. (e.g. Ben-Ner, 1993.)
 In helping to resolve these debates the empirical evidence for transition economies is
quite slim. While there have been some important early attempts to portray patterns of ownership
and corporate governance 1 usually, as noted by Aghion and Carlin (1997), many studies suffer
from problems including difficulties in obtaining data for large samples and a tendency to focus
only on selected cases, usually Russia and the Visegrad countries. In this paper, by drawing on
rich new enterprise-level data sets for more than 1,250 firms in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, we
 report findings relevant to a  broader group of countries and a larger number of firms than
hitherto has been available. Diverse patterns of enterprise ownership have emerged. Hence, since
the Baltic Republics began transition from substantially similar starting points, in examining the
effects of different ownership structures on enterprise performance,   the case of the Baltic
Republics potentially is especially informative. The structure of the paper is as follows.
In the next section we briefly review relevant theory. Next our firm-level data are used to 
2to provide one of the most comprehensive portraits of changing ownership structures in 
transition economies. In the main part of the paper, by estimating similar specifications for the
three Baltic Republics,  our unusual data enable us to examine competing hypotheses on the
effects of different ownership structures in newly privatized firms upon productive efficiency.
II Predictions from Economic Theory
Since ours is not a theoretical contribution, in this section we survey key themes in the
literature, which examines the relationship between enterprise productivity and enterprise
ownership. Given its importance in transition economies, our focus is on employee ownership. In
helping to clarify key issues it is helpful to review some typologies of firm types.
From the corporate governance literature, firms are often classified by ownership.  An
open joint-stock company issues publicly traded ownership shares and the company's assets are
owned by individuals in proportion to their share holdings, and the firm is controlled by those who
own a controlling packet of shares.  A closely held firm is owned and operated by a person or
group closely attached to the firm as owner(s) and/or manager(s).
In the case of open joint stock companies, with respect to the exercise of effective control
over enterprise operations, two alternative possibilities may be distinguished: ownership (which is
often used to indicate control) by insiders or outsiders. Insiders include all the people working in
the enterprise. An insider-controlled firm may be effectively controlled by its managers, by its
workers (either directly or indirectly, e.g .via a workers' council), or by some combination of the
two. Outsiders include those whose attachment to the enterprise is based on an ownership stake
rather than on work within the enterprise. Outsiders may be individual owners or shareholders, or
they may be institutional shareholders (i.e. financial intermediaries such as investment trusts.)
In the human resource management practices (HRMPs) literature (e.g. Lewin et al. 1997)
and the literature on the labor managed firm (e.g Bonin et al. 1993), typically a broader tack is
taken. For example, Ben-N r and Jones (1995) develop a typology of firms that is based on
different packages of HRMPs. In particular this typology distinguishes for different economic
agents the extent of participation in control versus participation in economic returns. Also, some
authors stress other aspects of ownership. For example, Mygind (1992,1997) emphasizes the
importance of thedistribution of ownership when classifying enterprises.
By referencing these typologies competing hypotheses concerning the relationship
3between enterprise productivity and employee participation in ownership may be generated. In the
first classification, the case for open joint-stock companies--and an active capital market in
company shares--rests mainly on the putative advantages of such a system in raising capital funds,
in allocating those funds flexibly among competing enterprises and in disciplining managers.
Outsider control means that enterprise decisions will be guided primarily by the objective of
maximizing returns on investors' capital. The justification for this approach is that only outsiders
can be expected to proceed rapidly with enterprise restructuring, not hesitating to liquidate
unprofitable assets and to dismiss redundant workers; moreover, outsiders are more likely to be
able to mobilize new resources to invest in the enterprise and less likely to be able to evoke and to
rely on soft government budget constraints.
The outsider-control model has several variants depending on the locus of effective
control and the terms on which shares are made available to buyers.  On the one hand, there could
be open sale of shares in corporatized state enterprises in the hope that a "strategic (core)
investor" will take over control, or in the expectation that an active stock market will discipline
management even in a context where share ownership is widely dispersed among many small
investors.  On the other hand, there could be established strong financial intermediary institutions
(holding companies, mutual funds, etc.) which are expected to buy controlling packets of shares in
companies and proceed to restructure and monitor them.  There also exists, however, the
possibility of a different outcome in the event that no external strategic investor takes over control
(because shares are diffused to many small investors, or because the bulk of the shares can't be
sold and remain in the hands of state property agencies), and no appropriate financial intermediary
institutions emerge, and no well-functioning capital market develops.  This default outcome is that
the locus of effective control over the "privatized" state enterprises really does not change -- it
continues to be run by previous managers, influenced by workers, with government authorities
continuing to take a strong interest in the enterprise.
 Critics question whether stock markets actually perform such function effectively,
especially in the formerly centrally planned economies with very underdeveloped capital market
institutions.  In addition, many hypothesize that firms owned by their workers will have inferior
economic performance.  It is argued that the perceived interests of enterprise workers are likely to
conflict in  important respects with the long-run interests of their enterprise. It is held that
workers will underinvest in capital equipment, that productivity will be low as worker-owners
4expend little effort and that layoffs will be resisted. The conventional wisdom is that significant
employee ownership will have detrimental effects on enterprise performance and undermine the
ability of newly-privatized firms to undertake meaningful restructuring  (e.g. Boycko et al. (1996.)
 However, some types of insider-owned structures, i.e. companies owned and operated by
their former managers, with a strong voice for workers, can be justified on several grounds (Ben-
Ner, 1993).  This is especially the case when insider-ownership co-exists with participatory
HRMPs (Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995). Advocates of closely held firms argue that such firms are
more likely to be characterized by a focussed, tightly-knit, flesh and blood ownership group with a
strong stake in enterprise performance--as compared with the alternative of external ownership of
joint stock companies. In insider controlled firms, the security and stability of the enterprise and
its work force will weigh more heavily in decision-making.
Arguably insider ownership and insider control is more conducive to enterprise stability
and long term employment relationships and thus may contribute to better economic performance
in a number of ways. In turn, this is especially likely to be the case when insider control is broadly
distributed, with non-managerial employees owning more shares than do managers (Mygind,
1996.) The closer alignment of the goals of the different economic agents within firms may better
motivate workers to join in restructuring efforts and to better use their accumulated experience
and firm-specific knowledge. In particular, a direct and positive effect of ownership by non-
managerial employees (as well as managers) may result from enterprise success being reflected in
a higher stock price.  In such cases, the interest of the firm is more aligned with the interest of its
employees.  For several reasons, these interest alignm nt effects can be expected to be more sig-
nificant in firms in which the precise institutional arrangements enable broad participation by
employees (and are not restricted to executives) and in which employee ownership constitutes a
significant part of the average employees' wealth.
Goal alignment effects of employee participation via information sharing  (e.g. small group
activities) are more subtle (but not necessarily weaker) than effects through ownership. Small
group activities may provide valuable opportunities for both management and labor to learn about
each other in a cooperative atmosphere, and thus to develop stronger trust.  With stronger trust,
sharing vital business information with labor will help convince labor that it is in their interest to
improve productivity and firm performance. Also, greater enterprise stability may encourage more
salvaging of still useful capital stock, and it may help to avoid a cascade of business failures due to
5the shutdown of one key enterprise in a productive structure still characterized by an inflexible
network of input sources and output outlets. 
III Privatization and Ownership Structures in the Baltics
 Since our econometric work hinges on the way that ownership structures and choices
differ by country, it is important to provide information on the varying institutional arrangements
as well as stylized facts on the issues under consideration. In particular we consider key aspects of
the differing legal arrangements and formal institutional structures (especially ownership
structures) that have emerged in the independent Baltic Republics in the 1990s.  We give special
consideration to employee ownership and privatization.2
Many of the institutions that characterized industrial relations during Soviet times have
either disappeared or have had their functions changed considerably. Thus while the old state
trade unions have been succeeded by new independent and plural unions, in all countries these
appear to be quite weak.3 Also, the usual panoply of enterprise level arrangements that potentially
provided for employee participation, such as production committees, brigades and the work
collective, existed  in the past in the Baltic Republics. However, these appear to have virtually
disappeared (e.g. Shteinbuka, 1995, for Latvia), though it is less clear what mechanisms today do
govern the employment relationship.
 Turning to the new ownership arrangements, compared to the Russian case (and also
those in Eastern and Central Europe), unsurprisingly not only have the Baltic States received
much less attention, but also much less is known about them.4  What is known is sometimes quite
surprising. Thus in Lithuania, privatization has proceeded even faster than in the Czech Republic
and,  as in Russia, the privatization program apparently has resulted in the development of 
extensive employee ownership. Moreover, this outcome has been consciously and consistently
encouraged by a favorable political climate with legislation introducing devices including
concessional shares for employees (and not encouraging foreign ownership.) Also, while vouchers
have been used, they had limited rights of transferability. Consequently, it appears that the bulk of
enterprises in Lithuania are m joritarian employee owned (Mygind, 1997.)
 By comparison, in Estonia, while initially there was some mild support for employee
ownership, best represented by the nurturing of a handful of "people's enterprises", the
privatization legislation did not convey special advantages to employees. Yet concerning the
6privatization of small firms, some advantages were given to employees -- e.g. through
concessional shares. Hence the employee ownership that has emerged apparently has largely
occurred in spite of legislation and a political climate which mainly had other objectives. Thus
there has been limited use of vouchers for privatization of enterprises and the bulk of the
privatization of big firms has come through mechanisms resembling those used in the former East
Germany -- with a Treuhand-like privatization agency soliciting tenders for state firms. A core
investor model has been encouraged and foreign ownership has been aggressively and fairly
successfully sought.
In Latvia soon after separation from the USSR there was an active debate on employee
ownership. While the details are sketchy it appears that the law on large-scale privatization does
not provide for any special advantages for employees. However, in practice, it appears that
insiders have been favored.  In some cases, this appears to have resulted from a management
and/or an employee buyout after a leasing plan had initially been introduced. But large scal
privatization has proceeded rather slowly in Latvia.5. However, small scale privatization has
proceeded faster and often, in part because of the influence of local authorities in the privatization
process, it appears that insiders have been favored.
While the discussion thus far suggests that there are believed to be very different patterns
of ownership emerging across and within the three Baltic Republics, at the same time,  data
available at enterprise level with which to gauge what is actually happening,  are often quite
limited. For example, the pioneering study of privatization in the B ltics by Frydman et al. (1993)
does not contain much enterprise-level information.
To begin to provide concrete information on some of these processes in the survey
countries, we draw on new survey data.6  So far as ownership is concerned, in many respects we
have data that are comparable in coverage across countries and also cover many areas, including
information on the extent of ownership amongst employees, managers, key groups of outsiders
and  the state. Thus if we define "control" as a group owning a majority of the voting shares, this
enables us to identify which group is the majority owner in each firm. That information, together
with key economic averages for our more than 1250 sample firms, is reported in Table 1.
Perhaps the most interesting data are for Estonia. The sample is large -- 655 firms in 1993,
falling to 566 firms by 1996-- and representative of the underlying population. For Estonia there is
evidence both of considerable heterogeneity in majority ownership as well as of substantial shifts
7in ownership configurations during 1993-1996. Thus whereas the most common form of majority
ownership is always state ownership, the importance of majority state ownership falls markedly,
with such firms accounting for 39% of the sample in 1993 but only 28% by 1996. Also while
there are always firms that are majority employee owned, their numbers fall dramaticallyBfrom
12% of the sample in 1993 to about 6% in 1996. By contrast cases of majority ownership by
managers become more common as do instances of majority outside ownership by both foreigners
and domestic citizens.
Compared to the Estonian case the data for Lithuania reveal very different patterns of
majority ownership though, as in Estonia, ownership configurations that often are quite fluid. In
Lithuania majority ownership by foreigners is always unimportant with by far the most important
type of majority ownership being ownership by domestic citizens. Compared to Estonia, majority
ownership by insiders is less important though the trends are consistent --between 1994 and 1995
more firms became majority owned by managers and there were fewer firms in which employees
have the majority stake. Also in Lithuania often ownership is quite dispersed -- in more than one-
in-four firms no clear majority owner can be identified.
Turning to Latvia, the situation is quite different from the other Baltic Republics. In both
years, ownership by insiders is much more pronounced and accounts for at least half of sample
firms (compared  with about 20% in Estonia and 12% in Lithuania.) While data are available only
for two consecutive years, nevertheless they suggest that ownership configurations are much
more stable in Latvia. For example, while the percentage of firms that are majority owned by
employees falls in all three countries, the decline is much slowest in Latvia.
IV Estimating Framework
 In designing our empirical strategy, we note that relatively little empirical work on the
effect of ownership structures on enterprise behavior is available for former communist countries.
Moreover, partly in response to the unusual difficulties that confront applied researchers in
transition countries - for example, the large measurement errors in key variables such as capital -
much work has been of an exploratory character.7 In this paper, by drawing on the huge literature
that has examined similar matters for firms in western countries and which is grounded in a well-
established conceptual framework, we adopt a different tack.8
In estimating the impact of various ownership structures on productive efficiency, for each
8country we therefore estimate equations of the general form:
Q = F(K, L, H, Z)                                  (1)
Where Q denotes a measure of output, K and L are a measure of total capital stock and total
employment; H is a vector of variables representing the effects of ownership structures;  and Z is
a vector of control variables such as industry and labor quality.  To see how the ownership
variables enter equation (1) consider the Cobb Douglas case when the effects of ownership
structures are disembodied. In logarithmic form this becomes:
lnQ =  Å0 + Å  lnK  + Æ  lnL  +  %i àiH  + %i ãiZ.                          (2)
In this paper, we estimate (1) by using the new enterprise-level data sets for each of the
three Baltic Republics.   Typically these data sets are derived by combining information contained
in two sources: (i) special ownership surveys (for which we have presented information on
ownership patterns in the previous section); (ii) information provided by the statistical authorities
on standard balance sheet and income statement variables, such as sales and capital stock and
information on employment and wages.9 Sinc  our data are typically available only for a short
period of time, and also because when multiple years of data are available we are interested in
comparing the influences on productive efficiency across countries , we emulate a strategy that
has been widely used in early empirical studies of transition economies (e.g. Estrin andEarle,
1996) and estimate OLS cross sectional regressions.10
In addition, the available data allow us to devise variables in the H vector that are identical
across countries. Specifically we always include a vector of five majority ownership variables --
whether the majority owners are employees, managers, domestic outsiders, or foreigners or
whether there is no majority (the omitted case is state majority ownership.)
For all countries, and unlike many other studies of transition economies,  th  measure of
enterprise  production we use is the conceptually preferable value added. For control variables, Z,
always our data allow us to include industry dummies, and one or more dummies that capture an
important regional dimension (e.g. in Estonia, location in Tallinn or otherwise.)
Another important aim of our analysis is to identify the most appropriate form of the
production function, in case the effects attributed to the ownership variables when a single
functional form is imposed are in fact due to misspecification of technology. We therefore
estimate diverse specifications and, after estimating forms including the generalized Cobb-
Douglas and translog production functions, the production function that is best supported by the
9data is selected on the basis of appropriate test statistics.11
Findings for the three countries are contained in Tables 2- 4. Before discussing the
findings concerning ownership for individual countries we first make some general observations. 
We see that in all estimates we see that the augmented production functions display reasonably
good fits for cross section estimation, with adjusted R2 of between 0.40-0.75. Also, in general the
coefficients on the factor inputs are precisely estimated at plausible levels. For example, in 1995 in
Latvia (Table 4) the CD factor weights indicate that, on average, Latvian firms operate with a
0.78 labor share and a capital share of about 0.21, thus indicating that there are essentially
constant returns to scale. So far as the choice of technology is concerned, ordinarily on the basis
of specification tests it is the translog form that proves to be the best choice and thus it is that
functional form of technology that is reported (in all cases except for Latvia in 1995.) Also, for all
countries and for all years we find that F tests reject the hypothesis that the joint effect of the set
of industry dummies upon productive efficiency is nil while support for the effects of regional
variables is much more mixed.
We begin first by looking at the results for Estonia. The effects of majority ownership are
shown in the vector of five-majority ownership dummy variables -- MAJFOR thru NOMAJ. (The
omitted category is MAJSTA, where the state is the dominant owner). The effects of these
ownership dummy variables upon performance hinge on their joint significance. F tests indicate
that in 1993, the joint effect of these ownership variables on productive efficiency is nil. However,
 one might  expect that the effects of employee ownership at least would not be evident until the
new structures had been in place for some time.12  Consistent with this view, when the exercise is
repeated for 1994 then an F test on the joint exclusion of the vector of ownership variables leads
us to reject he hypothesis that the various forms of ownership, taken together, do no aff ct
productivity.  A similar finding emerges when the exercise is repeated in 1995-- again we cannot
exclude the H vector from the preferred specification. Moreover, in those years, this conclusion
holds when specifications using other technology (e.g. Cobb Douglas) are estimated. In other
words, the statistically significant effects of the included ownership variables upon productive
efficiency do not depend on the particular functional form adopted to describe production
technology. However, by 1996 the effects of ownership had waned - the H vector can be
excluded from the preferred specification.
In addition, often the coefficients on particular forms of majority ownership are
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statistically significant. This is most apparent in 1994 when, relative to the omitted category of
majority state ownership, majority ownership by foreigners, employees or domestic individuals
enhances productive efficiency. Sometimes the size of the effect is quite large. Indeed the
coefficient estimates indicate that, relative to state ownership, majority ownership by foreigners
leads to performance that is at least 74% higher in both 1994 and 1995. According to these
estimates in both 1994 and 1995, there is support for the hypothesis that, compared to state
ownership, foreign ownership leads to less X inefficiency in Estonian firms and that majority
ownership by foreigners is the most efficient form of private ownership. However, in 1994,
contrary to the conventional wisdom, majority ownership by employees is found to be the
superior form of insider ownership. In addition, the estimates indicate that the pattern of findings
does not persist. Thus in 1996, no form of majority private ownership has effects on productive
efficiency that are statistically significant and the coefficients for both forms of outsider ownership
are negative. In other words from the reported specifications for 1996 (and 1993)  there is no
evidence that other forms of ownership are more or less productive than state firms.13
In addition, relative to majority state ownership, ownership without a clear majority has a
positive effect upon business performance in 1994 and 1995. The size of the effect is also
surprisingly large during these years (and especially in 1994.).
  Thus most of the time the results for Estonia may be interpreted as providing reasonably
strong support for the beneficial effects of privatization. Concerning the preferred ownership
form, the findings provide mild support for the hypothesis that outsider ownership produces
diverse benefits that result in better organizational performance (compared to state ownership).
Also, employee ownership produces more interest alignment and more involvement of employees
and, in turn, better organizational performance (compared to majority ownership by managers as
well as state ownership).  Equally the beneficial effects of new forms of private ownership are
found to be slow in coming (none are found in 1993) and, either are soon  dissipated (no benefits
are found for 1996) or, the state firms subsequently exhibit faster productivity growth. Finally, the
findings on the sometimes-beneficial effects of not having a clear majority owner suggest that
corporate governance problems in transition economies may not always be best addressed by
having a clear majority owner.
Turning to Lithuania (Table 3), when the common specification is estimated, the effects of
majority ownership upon productive efficiency are very different than in Estonia. F tests indicate
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that in both years the joint effect of the vector of five majority ownership dummy variables upon
productive efficiency is nil. Moreover, in both years there are no cases in which, relative to
majority state ownership, the effect of any individual form of private ownership is statistically
significant. In other words from the reported specifications for Lithuania there is no evidence that
other forms of ownership are more or less productive than are state firms. In turn, these findings
also provide no support for hypotheses on the preferred form of private ownership.
The results for Latvia are given in Table 4. The hypothesis that the joint effect of the
vector of majority ownership variables upon productive efficiency is nil is r jected in 1994 but
accepted in 1995. By inspection of individual ownership coefficients it is majority ownership by
domestic individuals that has the largest (and statistically significant) effect upon productive
efficiency. Thus in 1994 majority ownership by domestic individuals enhances performance by a
huge 75%. As such these findings reject the hypothesis that the preferred form of private
ownership is foreign ownership. However, for 1994 (though not for 1995), from the perspective
of the impact upon business productivity, these findings do provide support for the view that the
preferred form of insider ownership is majority ownership by managers (and not by employees.)
Finally, for 1994, compared to majority state ownership, the ownership structure that does best is
when there is no clear majority. Moreover the effect is an extraordinary 86% effect.
V. Conclusions
In this paper we report some of the first findings relating to the nature and effects of new
forms of enterprise ownership that are emerging in the post communist Baltic economies. These
findings are derived from new enterprise-level data for more than 1,250 firms in Latvia, Estonia
and Lithuania and are especially rich in details of ownership structures.
On the nature and scope of employee ownership, in all Baltic Republics insider (including
employee) ownership is quite prevalent. In many firms, insiders are the dominant owners. Also the
available data indicate that on average, most insiders are owners. Second, we see that there are,
substantial differences in ownership patterns within and across countries.  Third, as is most clear
from Estonia where the data on dynamics are more extensive, ownership patterns are not stable
but are evolving. Importantly there is evidence of growing ownership by managers and
diminishing instances of majority ownership by employees.
 To examine the potentially changing effects of ownership on enterprise productivity
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during transition, we estimate cross sectional production functions using identical specifications
for all three Baltic Republics. In these findings, perhaps the most interesting result is that the
effects of majority ownership vary enormously over time and across the three countries.  Thus
whereas in Estonia and Latvia, there is evidence that privatization matters, findings for Lithuania
indicate that the performance of state and privatized firms is not statistically significantly different.
And in Estonia, the effects of different ownership structures are much more apparent in 1994 and
1995 than in 1993 and 1996.
The evidence is quite mixed concerning hypotheses on the effects of particular ownership
configurations. Perhaps the strongest support for the conventional wisdom is found in Estonia
where in two years it is majority ownership by foreigners that is found to have the largest impact
on productive efficiency. At the same time, relative to state ownership, there is always evidence of
either positive or zero effects of employee ownership upon productivity. Moreover, in some
instances (e.g. Estonia 1994) majority ownership by employees is found to deliver better business
performance than does majority ownership by managers. Also, results for Latvia sometimes point
to ownership by domestic outsiders as the preferred form of outside ownership.
Since the Baltic Republics began transition from starting points that were quite
comparable in important respects, it is perhaps surprising to uncover evidence of considerable
differences in the effects of ownership (including employee ownership) on productivity across
countries. However, studies that typically have used other empirical approaches to investigate the
effects of ownership in other transition countries have failed to uncover consistent findings.14 In
addition, there is abundant evidence for other western experiences that the productivity effects of
particular forms of ownership, for example employee ownership, differ markedly from one
institutional setting to another (e.g. Bonin, Jones and Putterman, (1993); Doucouliagos, 1995). 
Hence  it is likely that in accounting for differences in findings across countries that some of 
differences in the institutional settings as well as differences in policies will be playing a part.
 However, it must be stressed that, for a variety of reasons, our results must be considered
as preliminary. There is an acute need for additional research in this dynamic area. Always we are
able to examine for only some of the sets of ownership and participation variables which theory
suggests are pertinent. (In particular we have no good measures of employee influence or of other
HRMPs that may interact with ownership to influence productive efficiency and decisions on
employment levels.) Also, to enable common specifications to be estimated across countries and
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over time, our multivariate analysis is based on cross sectional estimates that have many
potentially well-known problems. Also some of our samples may also suffer from selection biases.
What this means is that much additional work remains to be done. Some of this can only be
sensibly done by gathering additional data, by searching for the preferred specification for each
country and by employing alternative empirical approaches.15
However, were these results to be corroborated in subsequent work they would have
several implications. In particular, they may inform the often-heated debates on privatization that
has been accompanied by an unexpected amount of insider, especially non-managerial worker
ownership in many countries, not only in the Baltics but also in other transition economies, for
example Russia. 
Table 1:   Descriptive Statistics Means (Standard Deviations)
Estonia Lithuania Latvia
1993 1996 1994 1995 1994 1995
Value Added 4445
(17946)
8537
(18245)
4698
(7166)
4623
(9999)
887873
(1537911)
1043451
(1640613)
Fixed Assets 8258
(44955)
18245
(93433)
8939
(19570)
12302
(32246)
233614
(583898)
268494
(616905)
Employment 152
(513.8)
130
(506.7)
552
(737.8)
352
(467.8)
121
(211.9)
115
(177.6)
MAJFOR (#) 83
(13%)
88
(16%)
4
(1%)
7
(2%)
11
(8%)
13
(9%)
MAJDOM (#) 122
(9%)
134
(24%)
123
(38%)
195
(43%)
34
(25%)
35
(24%)
MAJMAN (#) 62
(10%)
90
(16%)
6
(2%)
33
(7%)
36
(26%)
38
(26%)
MAJEMP (#) 80
(12%)
36
(6%)
29
(9%)
24
(5%)
35
(25%)
32
(22%)
NOMAJ (#) 58
(9%)
60
(11%)
93
(29%)
121
(27%)
8
(6%)
12
(8%)
14
MAJSTATE (#) 255
(3%)
158
(28%)
70
(22%)
72
(16%)
16
(12%)
14
(10%)
n 655 566 325 452 138 144
Note: 1. Value variable are in current prices and in thousands of units of the local currency.
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Table 2: Estonia Production Functions, 1993-1996
 1993 1994 1995 1996
Constant 1.8451* 1.8702* 2.8940* 3.6163*
(0.5755) (0.5531) (0.6478) (0.7658)
Ln FA 0.1876*** 0.1331 0.1145 0.2486
(0.1126) (0.1317) (0.1367) (0.1918)
Ln EMP 0.8344* 1.2590*** 0.9101* 0.7583
(0.0017) (0.2256) (0.2479) (0.3173)
Ln FASQ -0.0167 -0.0352* -0.0223*** -0.0479***
(0.0110) (0.0138) (0.0124) (0.0171)
Ln EMPSQ -0.0247 -0.0905*** -0.0735*** -0.1000**
(0.0431) (0.0500) (0.0450) (0.0563)
Ln EMP*Ln FA 0.0370 0.0802*** 0.0876** 0.1394*
(0.0338) (0.0462) (0.0396) (0.0494)
MAJFOR -0.2098 0.7445* 0.7907** -0.0781
(0.2556) (0.2226) (0.2955) (0.3132)
MAJDOM 0.2238 0.5420* 0.1086 -0.0976
(0.1881) (0.1841) (0.2567) (0.2800)
MAJMAN 0.1584 0.2268 0.0323 0.0122
(0.2546) (0.2240) (0.2745) (0.2934)
MAJEMP 0.3516 0.4405*** 0.2152 0.3420
(0.2351) (0.2526) (0.3259) (0.4017)
NOMAJ 0.3592 0.7034* 0.361** 0.1483
(0.2631) (0.2404) (0.215) (0.3263)
INDDUM Yes* Yes*** Yes** Yes*
Tallinn 0.4401**     0.1747             0.1172                -
0.0770
(0.1499)     (0.1457)           (0.1584)             
(0.1927)
n  531        620 511    443
R2 0.51          0.46          0.52                         0.41
Notes:  * significant 1% level; ** significant 5% level; *** significant 10% level.
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Table 3: Lithuania: Production Functions 1994-1995
1994 1995
Constant -4.566* -5.946
(5.9906) (11.947)
In FA 2.7168* 1.7244
(0.7976) (1.7525)
In EMP -2.1208* 1.6701
(0.1107) (2.2503)
In FASQ -0.1720* -0.0572
(0.0339) ( 0.0838)
In EMPSQ -0.3092* - 0.1459
(0.1107) (0.2062)
In EMP * LnFA 0.4482* 0.0452
(0.1084) (0.2467)
MAJFOR 0.5089 0.9830
(0.9221) (1.607)
MAJDOM -0.1090 -0.0397
(0.3016) (0.5508)
MAJMAN -0.0654 0.3373
(0.7846) (1.5811)
MAJEMP 0.2186 0.7073
(0.4284) (1.0451)
NOMAJ 0.0412 -0.3616
(0.3058) (0.5936)
INDDUM Yes* Yes**
REGION Yes*** Yes
n 295 318
R 2 0.44 0.19
Notes:  * significant 1% level; ** significant 5% level; *** significant 10% level.
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Table 4: Latvia: Production Functions 1994-1995
1994 1995
Constant 9.0849* 7.2064*
(1.0705) (0.5158)
In FA -0.2693 0.2096*
(0.3197) (0.0502)
In EMP 1.0779*** 0.7846**
(0.6083) (0.1059)
In FASQ -0.0030
(0.0206)
In EMPSQ -0.1897***
(0.0719)
In EMP * lnFA 0.1200
(0.0762)
MAJFOR 0.4838 0.3567
(0.320) (0.2978)
MAJDOM 0.7500* 0.3986***
(0.2435) (0.2190)
MAJMAN 0.4183***  0.1630
(0.2538) (0.2477)
MAJEMP 0.3295  0.3535
(0.2424) (0.2485)
NOMAJ 0.8613** 0.4488
(0.3786) (0.3170)
INDDUM Yes* Yes*
REGION 0.0096 0.2073
(0.1856) (0.1623)
n 128 132
R 2 0.70 0.65
Notes:  * significant 1% level; ** significant 5% level; *** significant 10% level.
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Notes
                                         
1. Most studies are for Russia (e.g. Blasi et al. (1997), Earle and Estrin (1996) and Jones
(1998.) For Visegrad countries see Frydman et al. (1998) and Pohl et al. (1997). For general
reviews ee World Bank (1996) and Aghion and Carlin (1997.)
2. Our account draws heavily on  (Mygind, 1996). We do not consider the fading days of
communism and, for example, attempts at reform by leasing.
3. See Mygind (1996) and for the case of Estonia, see Jones (1996).
4. For accounts of these countries which also document the substantial differences in policies
besides privatization, see the country reports of the World Bank and Mygind (1996).
5. By mid 1994 it was  estimated that only 85 of 698  large firms had been privatized (EBRD,
1994) See also EBRD (1998) for more recent data.
6. These ownership surveys were designed by Mygind in collaboration with local teams in
each of the Baltic Republics. For further information see Mygi d (1996).
7. The main approach is to estimate cross sectional regressions in which the dependent
variable is a measure of performance and ownership and other controls (often including a
lagged value of the dependent variable) are the regressors (e.g. Earle and Estrin, 1996). See
alsoFrydman et al., (1997) in which  key variables are measured in privatization (rather than in
calendar)  time and performance is an average (a growth rate) over a period of time (rather
than for a single year).
8.  For reviews of work that often uses a production function or an efficiency frontier
approach see Ben-Ner et al. (1996), Doucouliagos (1995) and Blinder (1990). Also see Jones
(1993) for evidence on the effects of employee ownership in Polish firms during the planning
period and Jones et al. (1998) for evidence for Bulgarian firms during early transition.
9. In this process we lose some observations. However, based on two sample mean t tests,
there do not appear to be any significant differences in the nature of the samples that are used
for  the econometrics (reported in Tables 2-4) and the descriptive exercises (Table 1).
10. Eventually we plan to use panel data to estimate various other specifications of Eq. (1),
including using fixed and random effects methods. However, since it is also  mportant to
examine for the potentially changing impact of  firm characteristics during this period of
systemic change,  cross sectional estimates are also a useful strategy.
11. In unreported results we also estimated specifications using other forms of production
technology, including Kmenta's approximation to the constant elasticity of substitution (CES).
 Depending upon the specification and the year the production function best supported by the
data always is either CD or translog. However, the key coefficients of interest are not affected
by the form of production technology.
12. For Japanese firms Jones and Kato (1995) find that  employee ownership affects enterprise
performance after a considerable lag.
                                                                                                                              
13. Similar findings emerge from two sets of unreported regressions in which we use: (i)
continuous measures of ownership; (ii) continuous measures of voting strength (based on
differing ownership levels).
14. For reviews see Aghion and Carlin (1997.) Upon closer inspection, even the evidence for
the proposition that finds most support -- that foreign ownership has beneficial effects upon
firm performance -- is not overly strong. (e.g. Frydman et al. (1998).
15. For the case of Estonia see Jones and Mygi  (1998.)
